Since the end of Bremer’s tenure and the handing over of sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004, the US administration has admitted, tacitly, that things haven’t worked. The opening of the US Embassy was supposed to be a new start but the changes have been grudging and cosmetic. Interim Ambassador John Negroponte did hire four Arabists as top advisers, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has increased the number of Arabists in Iraq. But Bodine thinks these moves are mere tinkering, not signs of a change in attitude. Indeed, according to a report by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, as of last year fewer than 100 Arabic-speaking foreign-service officers were stationed around the country. Even as it beefs up its personnel, the new US Embassy in Baghdad will have too few Arabists.
In the Weekly Standard, former cia officer Reuel Marc Gerecht complained that “the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency produced woefully few first-rate Arabists. The collapse of this profession parallels the deterioration of Islamic and Arabic studies in the American Academy, which in any case often disdains government service for its graduates.” As of December 2004, according to Juan Cole, an Arabist at the University of Michigan, only about 10,000 US students were studying Arabic.
After serving as the US National Security Council’s point man in Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American, was sworn in last June as the new ambassador in Baghdad. He had previously been the US viceroy in Afghanistan, and had worked at Policy Planning before joining the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz group that laid the ideological groundwork for the invasion. Knowing Afghanistan, however, gives Khalilzad no particular qualifications for Iraq. When Khalilzad discusses the danger of warlordism in Iraq, he fails to acknowledge that warlordism is a rural, Afghan phenomenon and that Iraq is essentially an urban, Arab society. Nonetheless, the new ambassador appears to be as close to an Arabist as the US administration is willing to put in a position of high responsibility.
While the US insists it is trying to lower its profile in Iraq, it maintains an enormous embassy with roughly 5,000 employees. Most hardly ever venture outside of Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone. Because of the violence, diplomats must leave their families behind and their tours of duty are limited to a year—hardly long enough to forge relationships with Iraqis. Brenda Greenberg, a human-resources officer at the State Department, told me somewhat defensively that the State Department has “at least nineteen Arabic-speaking employees in Baghdad.” But the department has access to roughly 400 Arabic speakers, and one wonders why they are not being put to more effective use.
The relative silence coming from Washington regarding American Arabists and Arabic-speakers doesn’t bode well. Together with an exit strategy confined to using an ill-prepared Iraqi army to replace the US military, it suggests that the administration remains reluctant to engage ordinary Iraqis on their own terms. Reports to Congress, political statements, and even the US embassy website all state that the US civilian presence in Iraq will help bring American values, globalization, and the free market to this war-torn country. It’s the sort of corporate-sounding mission statement that can only, in the long run, fuel resistance and mistrust. If the goal is to leave behind a stable Iraq, engaging Iraqis through their own culture, language, and history—not just at the diplomatic level, but with expertise applied all over the country—might produce far better results than have been seen to date. That sort of engagement requires trained Arabists.
